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PRICE RIGIDITIES AND RATIONING 
G. van der Laan and A.J.J. Talman 
1. Introduction 
Perfect competition is a basic assumption in classical economie theory. This 
implies that all agents in the economy are price takers and therefore express their 
demands and supplies of the commodities given the prevailing prices. A market is in 
equilibrium if total demand is equal to total supply. Trade will only take place at 
equilibrium prices. It is assumed that there are no restrictions on the prices and that 
prices adjust infinitely fast. Walras considered the problem of the existence of 
general equilibrium, i.e., a system of prices at which all markets clear simultaneously. 
Under rather general assumptions the existence of such a Walrasian price system has 
been proved in the fifties by Debreu and others. 
Unemployment and excess supply on commodity markets are serious problems 
in many countries. Almost all semi-annual meetings of the government leaders of the 
European common market countries are mainly devoted to tackle problems like butter 
mountains, wine pools, milk lakes, grain warehouses, olive pyramids, dung-hills, and 
an unemployment army. In these cases price restrictions and regulations prevent 
prices from adjusting according to the law of supply and demand. So, prices can not 
reach their Walrasian equilibrium values; nevertheless, trade takes place. In fact, 
markets are cleared through the adjustment of quantities instead of prices, e.g., by 
imposing quotas. 
In the mid seventies Drèze (1975) and Benassy (1975) independently 
developed models for equilibrium under price rigidities, such as price controls, 
minimum wages or price indexation. Both authors introduced the concept of quantity 
rationing in general equilibrium models under restrictions on the prices. In this 
approach an agent chooses that commodity bundie which is most preferred by him, 
subject to both his budget constraint and to quantity constraints on net trade. The 
quantity rationing may affect either supply or demand of a commodity, but it never 
affects both simultaneously. It is further assumed that no quantity restrictions are 
allowed unless price rigidities are binding. 
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The models of Drèze and Benassy differ in the way they describe the 
behaviour of the individual agents under quantity rationing. In Drèze's model, the 
agents express their rationed demands and supplies, i.e., on each market the agents' 
demands and supplies satisfy the imposed rationing scheme. This kind of behaviour 
has also been studied by Younès (1975), Grandmont and Laroque (1976), Hahn 
(1978), Laroque (1978), van der Laan (1980), and Kurz (1982). In the model of 
Benassy the agents express their effective demands and supplies. This notion goes 
back to Clower (1965) and Barro and Grossman (1971) and reflects the agent's 
demand or supply for a commodity when he takes into account only the rationing on 
the other commodities. For example, if a consumer is constrained in the demand for 
milk, he compensates his desire for milk through a higher demand for wine, 
irrespective of the rationing on the wine market. On the other hand, his effective 
demand for milk will not take into account the rationing on milk and typically 
exceeds the Ievel of rationing, due to rationing on wine and other substitutes. 
Whereas for Drèze's model the expressed and realized quantities of trade are in 
equilibrium equal to each other, in the model of Benassy trade is realized through 
assignments induced by the effective demands and supplies. These assignments yield 
new perceived rationing schemes. Equilibrium is defined as a state in which agents 
have no incentive to adjust their effective demands or supplies according to these 
new schemes. 
Under price rigidities, Drèze and Benassy proved the existence of an 
equilibrium such that at least one a priori chosen numeraire commodity is not 
rationed at all, while for the other commodities there is rationing on the demand or 
the supply side, but not on both sides of the same market simultaneously. If money is 
one of the commodities, this commodity can be chosen to be the numeraire, implying 
that there exists an equilibrium with no rationing on money. 
In practice, rationing of supplies seems to occur much more frequently than 
rationing of demands. Moreover, both van der Laan (1980) and Kurz (1982) argue 
that in practice it is difficult to implement rationing of demand. These observations 
lead these authors to prove the existence of a so-called supply-constrained or 
unemployment equilibrium. In such an equilibrium only supplies are rationed whereas 
at least one commodity is not rationed at all. However, which commodities are not 
rationed is not known in advance, so that it can not be assumed that there is an 
unemployment equilibrium in which the supply of an a priori chosen commodity is 
unrationed. Not surprisingly, more price flexibility is needed to assure the existence 
of an unemployment equilibrium in which an a priori given commodity is not 
rationed. This topic has been attacked by van der Laan (1984), Dehez and Drèze 
(1984), and Weddepohl (forthcoming), by introducing flexible money prices. 
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Rationing of the supplies has a serious impact on the income of the rationed 
agents. Therefore van der Laan (1980, 1981) considered models with unemployment 
compensations for unemployed people. 
This paper has been organized as follows. In the next section we give the basic 
assumptions about the Walrasian model of an exchange economy. In Section 3 we 
introducé price rigidities and define constrained equilibria. Section 4 deals with 
effective demand and treats the model of Benassy. This model yields the so-called 
neo-Keynesian or K-equilibrium. In Section 5 the different types of K-equilibria are 
discussed. Also we give a characterization of the types of equilibria for the well-
known Malinvaud model. In Section 6 we discuss the problem of manipulable 
rationing schemes. The existence of constrained equilibria will be proved in Section 
7. After a discussion about supply-constrained and demand-constrained equilibria in 
Section 8, the existence of supply-constrained equilibria without rationing on the 
money commodity is proved in Section 9. In Section 10 we motivate the occurrence 
of supply-constrained equilibria. In the following two sections several models with 
unemployment compensations are considered, in Section 11 some models without 
money and in Section 12 a model for a monetary economy. In the latter model the 
policy of compensations results in inflationary or deflationary impulses. 
2. Preliminaries 
We consider an exchange economy with n+1 commodities, indexed j -
0,1,...,n, and m agents, indexed i = l,...,m. For simplicity, we assume that each agent 
represents a consumer (or household), who maximizes his utility under the budget 
constraint and quantity constraints. Consumer i, i = l,...,m, is characterized by a 
consumption set X1, a utility function u1 on X1 representing his preferences, and a 
vector of initial endowments w1 e R n + 1 . Let ft = {x £ R n + 1 | x= > 0, j = 0,...,n} denote 
the nonnegative orthant of R . For all i, we make the following assumptions, 
where w = Ej w1 is the vector of total initial endowments. 
A | . The consumption set X1 is a compact ^ , convex subset of ft, containing 
the set {x e ft | x: < wj, 0 = l,...,n}. 
' It is sufficiënt to assume that the sets X are closed. However to simplify the proofs we assume that the sets 
are compact, i.e., closed and bounded. 
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A2. The utility function is a strictly quasi-concave 2' continuous function 
from X1 to R, satisfying monotonicity, i.e., for all x,y e X1, x= > y: for all j 
and X: > y:,for at least one j implies u*(x) > ux(y). 
A3. For each commodity j , w1- > 0. 
Given p in fi/{0}, let d*(p) e X1 be a consumption bundie satisfying consumer i's 
budget constraint pTx < pTw*, such that no other x e X1 satisfying the budget 
constraint is preferred to d'(p). Under the assumptions Aj , A2 , and A3 such a 
consumption bundie exists and is preferred to all other x e X1 satisfying the budget 
constraint, which implies that d'(p) is unique. Moreover, the assumptions imply that 
consumer i's demand function d1: fi/{0} -+ X1 is continuous. Let z(p) denote the total 
excess demand at price p, i.e., 
z(p) = Ej (d*(p) - w1). 
Then the function z is a continuous function from ft/{0} to R satisfying for all p 
e n/{0}, 
i) p z(p) = 0 (Walras' law, i.e., the total value of the excess demands is equal 
to zero), 
ii) z(Ap) = z(p) for all A > 0 (homogeneity of degree zero), 
iii) z:(p) > 0 if p: = 0 (desirability). 
* * 
A price vector p is called a Walrasian equilibrium price vector if z(p ) = 0, i.e., if 
p is a zero point of z. For the proof of the existence of such a price vector we refer 
to Debreu (1959) and others. 
3. Constrained equilibrium 
Drèze (1975) considered the problem of restrictions on the prices. In his 
model the commodity indexed by j = 0 serves as the numeraire commodity. Because 
of the homogeneity property its price can be set equal to one without loss of 
generality. The prices of the other commodities are restricted from below and above 
by constants p_; and p: for commodity j , j = l,...,n. In a later section we will 
discuss more general price restrictions. Assuming that for all j # 0, 0 < Q.- < p- < 
00, the nonempty set PQ of admissible prices becomes 
' It is sufficiënt to assume quasi-concavity of the utility functions. However, assuming strict quasi-concavity 
implies that the demand functions are continuous functions instead of upper semi-continuous multifunctions. 
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P 0 = {p G n | p 0 = 1, Ej < Pj < Pj for all j * 0}. 
* Because of the restrictions on the prices, an equilibrium price vector p does not 
need to be an element of PQ. Drèze (1975) defined an equilibrium concept involving 
quantity constraints on the individual excess supplies and excess demands. For a price 
vector p G PQ, a vector ll G -n of constraints on the net supplies of consumer i, and 
a vector L1 6 fi of constraints on the net demands of i, the constrained budget set of 
consumer i becomes 
B\vJ,L{) = {x G X11 pTx < .pTw\ l'1 < x-w1 < L1}. 
The constrained demand of consumer i, denoted d^p,/1,!,1), is defined as the element 
in the constrained budget set of i which maximizes i's utility. Because of the strict 
quasi-concavity of u1 this element is uniquely determined. We say that agent i is 
rationed on the demand (supply) of commodity j if y1 is preferred to x1 = d^p,/1,!,1) 
where y1 maximizes i's utility in the budget set of i when L1- is increased (l1-
decreased respectively) with an arbitrarily small amount. The strict quasi-concavity 
of the utility function implies that a consumer is not rationed on the demand (or 
supply) of commodity j if x1- - w*j < [}• (or x1: - w1- > /*•). 
Definition 3.1. A constrained equilibrium is a set of consumptions x1 e X1, i = 
l,...,m, a set of supply rationing schemes l1 G -fi and demand rationing schemes L1 e 
ft, i = l,...,m, and a price vector p G PQ such that 
a) for all i, x1 = d^p,/1,!1), 
b) Ej x1 = w, 
c) for all j , x1: - w'1- = Ll- for some i implies x • - w • > / • for all h, and 
i t i h h h 
x : - w : = / • for some i implies x : - w • < L • for all h, 
d) for all j , p: < p: implies Ll- > x1- - w1; for all i, and p: > p.- implies Z1-
< x1- - w1- for all i. 
Conditions a) and b) require that the consumption of each agent equals his 
constrained demand and that the total consumption equals the total initial 
endowment. Condition c) implies that at a constrained equilibrium not both sides of a 
market are rationed simultaneously. We say that a market is frictionless when there is 
rationing on at most one side of the market. So, condition c) requires that in 
equilibrium each market must be frictionless. Finally, condition d) guarantees that in 
equilibrium there is no demand rationing if the price is not on its upper bound and 
that there is no supply rationing if the price is not on its lower bound. 
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There are two trivial constrained equilibria: x1 = w1 for all i, ll - 0 for all i, 
Ll- > 0 for all i and j , and p = p_; and x1 = w1 for all i, ll- < 0 for all i and j , L1 = 0 
for all i, and p = p. In the first case there is complete rationing on all excess 
supplies, so that for all i w1 is the unique element of i's constrained budget set of i 
and therefore satisfies condition a). In the second case there is complete rationing on 
all excess demands. Then the budget set of i becomes 
B^p,/1,!,1) - {xeX11 pTx < p T w\ l{ < x-w1 < 0}, 
so that él(p,ll,Lx) equals w1 due to the monotonicity assumption. We conclude this 
section with two definitions. 
Definition 3.2. A constrained equilibrium is a Drèze equilibrium if for all i, /JQ = -oo 
and L1^ = oo. 
Definition 3.3. A constrained equilibrium is a supply-constrained (or unemployment) 
equilibrium if for all i, Ll- - oo for all j and l1- - -oo for at least one j . 
Observe that both the Drèze and the supply-constrained equilibrium are nontrivial 
equilibria. In the Drèze equilibrium there is no rationing on the numeraire 
commodity. In a supply-constrained equilibrium there is no rationing on the demand 
side, while at least one commodity is not constrained on the supply side. The 
existence of Drèze and supply-constrained equilibria will be proved in Section 7. 
4. Effective demands and K-eauilibria 
In the Drèze model it is assumed that an agent reveals his constrained demand 
d^p,/1,!,1). This constrained demand is the respond of the agent to the message 
(p,/1,!,1) called by an auctioneer. In this respond the consumer takes into account his 
quantity constraints. Because the constrained demands are revealed, we have that in 
equilibrium there is no difference between the expressed demands and the realized 
transactions. All agents choose a consumption bundie out of their constrained budget 
set and the expressed demand satisfies therefore the rationing schemes. So, the 
constrained demands do not reveal binding constraints, i.e., a constrained agent does 
not reveal his desire to trade more. Now, suppose we have consumption bundies x1 e 
X1, i = l,...,m, a set of rationing schemes l1 e -fi and L1 e n, i = l,...,m, and a price 
vector PGPQ such that the conditions a), b) and d) of Definition 3.1 are satisfied, but 
condition c) is violated. In this case at least one market is not frictionless, i.e., on at 
least one market some agents are constrained in their excess demands and some others 
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in their excess supplies. Both the demand-eonstrained and supply-constrained agents 
can be made better off by trading more. However, there are no signals about this 
desire to trade more, because the agents express just their constrained demands. So, 
the economy can get stuck in this situation, violating condition c) of frictionless 
markets in equilibrium. To get out of such situations the agents have to reveal their 
desired trades instead of their constrained demands. 
Following Clower (1965), Leijonhufvud (1968) and others, Benassy (1975) 
used the concept of effective demand. The effective demand of an agent for a 
commodity reveals an individual's offer to buy or to sell on the market, and not the 
actually realized constrained transaction. This effective demand is expressed 
separately on each market and does not take into account the rationing scheme 
perceived on that market. To reach equilibrium, each agent is assigned a transaction 
and perceives therefore new quantity constraints on his exchange. Due to these new 
constraints, each agent will express new effective demands, and so on. An 
equilibrium is reached when the new perceived constraints coincide with the previous 
ones and all markets are frictionless. This type of disequilibrium models in which the 
expressed demands may differ from the realized transactions has been studied by 
Barro and Grossman (1971), Malinvaud (1977), and in a general context by Benassy 
(1975, 1982). 
In Benassy's analysis the price vector is completely fixed, i.e., p_: = p: for 
all j and hence PQ contains only one element, denoted by p. The numeraire 
commodity j = 0 is assumed to be money, which serves as the sole medium of 
exchange. Consumers derive utility from money as a store of value. It is assumed that 
money buys commodities and vice versa, but commodities do not buy commodities. 
So, there are n markets, and transactions between commodities and money take place 
on each market. The difference between an individual's terminal holding and initial 
holding of money is equal to the difference between the money values of the initial 
and terminal bundie of commodities. On each market rationing may occur. The 
reasoning above implies that there is only rationing on the demand or supply of the 
consumption goods and labour and not on money. So, in this section the rationing 
scheme of a consumer i will be a pair (l1, L1) with ll E -fi, L1 e O, and - / ^ = ÜQ = 
oo. 
When e1 = (e1 | ,„.,e1n)T is a demand vector of agent i for the non-money 
commodities, then, given the rationing scheme (Z1,!,1), the resulting trade of 
commodity j for agent i will be 
zlp\l\l}) = max(/ij, min(eij - wVj, L1-)), j - l,...,n. 
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To be sure that the resulting assignments x1:(e1,/1,L1) = w1: + zI:(e1,/1,L1) of the non-
numeraire commodities j # 0 and the resulting terminal holding x1Q(e1,/1,L1) = W*Q -
E: PjZ1:(e1,/1,L1) of the numeraire commodity are feasible, any demand vector e1 e 
R n of agent i must be restricted to the set 
Z\l{,l}) = (e1 e R n | xVeVU1) G X1}, 
with x^e1,/1,!,1) the (n+l)-vector with components \1-(el,l1,L1), j = 0,...,n. The 
demand vector expressed by agent i should be an element in Zty1,!,1) which 
maximizes the resulting utility \x\x\e\l\L1)) over all e1 in Z\ll,l}). Let Ety1,!,1) be 
the set of all such elements in Z\ll,Ll). Clearly, the constrained demand vector 
c\ll,L}) where cl-All,Ll) = d^p,/1 , !1) for the non-numeraire commodities j = l,...,n 
belongs to the set '£\ïi,L1) since the constrained demand &\$,ll,Ll) maximizes u1 
under the quantity constraints l1 and L1. However, generally the set Ety1,/,1) contains 
more than one element. In particularly, we will show that one of these elements is 
the effective demand. 
The effective demand on a market is defined as the utility maximizing 
demand for that commodity without taking into account the quantity constraints on 
that market (see Benassy (1982)). Formally, the effective demand e1^/1,!,1) of 
consumer i for commodity j + 0 is the j - th component of the vector which solves 
the problem 
max uJ(x) such that 
x 6 X1, pTx < pTw1, and l \ < xh - w\ < L\, h # 0,j. (pj) 
In this constrained maximization problem the consumer takes into account all 
quantity constraints except the constraints on market j . Recall that there are no 
constraints for j = 0, so that h + 0,j might be replaced by h # j . Let <^1-'(71,L1) be 
the solution to problem (PJ). Solving this problem for each j = l,...,n, we obtain the 
effective demand vector ety1,!,1) G R n of consumer i, i = l,...,m, by taking for each 
commodity j the j - th component of the corresponding solution vector, i.e. 
Jf\Ll) - ^f\L\ j = 1 ,n. 
Clearly, in general the effective excess demand tl-{ll,Ll) - w1- does not satisfy the 
rationings l1- and L1- on market j . However, under assumption A2 the effective 
demand vector belongs to ~E\ll,Ll). We remark that concavity of the utility function 
is not sufficiënt (see Grandmont (1977)). In the following we denote the trade 
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Zj (e ( / ,L ) , / , £ ) on market j resulting from the effective demand e (/ ,L ) by 
V ' * z\i!\L\ j = l,...,n 
Theorem 4.1. Under A2 , e'(/ X ) 6 EtyM1) holds. 
Proof: Following Benassy (1982, pages 188/9) it can be shown that under strict quasi-
concavity of the utility function u1, the trade z1^/1,!,1) on market j is equal to the 
constrained excess demand cl-(ll,Ll) - wJj, j = l,...,n. Since c\ll,Ll) belongs to 
Ety1,!,1) this proves the theorem. ^ 
The set of rationing schemes (Z1,!,1), i = l,...,m, is said to constitute an 
effective demand equilibrium if Sj z1^/1,!,1) = 0, j = l,...,n. From the f act that 
zx-(ll,Ll) equals cl-(ll,Ll) - w1- for all i and j , it follows that an effective demand 
equilibrium yields a constrained equilibrium only when the realized consumption x1: 
= zxdll,Ll) + w1- satisfies condition c) of Definition 3.1 for all i and for all j # 0. 
This condition of frictionless markets possibly may not hold at an effective demand 
equilibrium. Observe that condition d) is redundant because PQ contains only p as the 
unique element. If, for some j , Ej z1:(/1,L1) # 0, then transactions on market j can 
not be carried out and we do not have a constrained equilibrium. 
To reach a constrained equilibrium, a set of assignment functions F1: R n m —. 
Rn , i = i,...,m, is introduced. These assignment functions are such that on each 
market the total assignments to the demanders is equal to the total assignments to the 
suppliers whereas on the short side of the market the agents realize their effective 
excess demands. More precisely, if ê = (ë ,...,ëm) e R n m is a set of 
effective excess demand vectors given by ë1: = el-All,Ll) - w1:, j = l,...,n, i = 
l,...,m, then for all j the assignments z1: = F ^ ë ) , i = l,...,m satisfy the following 
conditions: 
1) Ej zVj = 0, 
2) for all i, 0 < z1- < ê1- if ë1: > 0, and ëXj < zXj < 0 if ê1- < 0, 
3) for all i, z\j = ë1- if ë*j > 0 and E| ë1: < 0, and z1^ = ëJj if 
e
1
: < 0 and E| ë1: > 0. 
Condition 1) says that the assignments can be realized, condition 2) that one can not 
force any agent to exchange more than he wants and that all agents remain at the 
same side of the markets after assignment, and condition 3) that agents on the short 
side of the market can realize their effective excess demands. The last condition will 
imply frictionless markets, since on at most one side of the market agents can not 
realize their effective demands. 
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Given a set of effective excess demands the functions F1, i = l,...,m, 
determine realizable transactions of each consumer for the non-money commodities. 
The resulting changes in money holdings follow immediately from the fact that 
commodities are exchanged against money, i.e., Z*Q = -E: PjZ1:, i = l,...,m. 
Although the assignments are realizable, this does not imply that transactions 
will in fact take place. Through the assignments each individual i may perceive on 
market j a difference between his expected transaction zV/1, Ll) and his assignment 
z
1:. Based on this observation the individual wants to adjust his perceived rationing 
scheme. Since for all j , both z1-^1, L1) and z1- are determined by the set of effective 
excess demand vectors, we may assume that this new scheme, say (fc1,^1), is a 
function of the effective excess demands only. More precisely, we assume that for all 
i, i = l,...,m, 
fc1 = gJ(ë) and Kl = G^ë), 
with g1: R n m — R n + 1 and G1: R n m -+ R n + 1 functions satisfying gJ0(ê) = -oo and 
G'gCë) = oo, and for all j * 0 
4) g'jCê) < m i n (°>zlj) a n d G ^ ë ) > max (0,zJj) if z*j = %X-
5) g ^ ë ) = z*j if z]j > ëVj and G ^ ë ) = zVj if z^ < ë J j . 
These conditions say that the new rationing scheme allows for the assignments to be 
carried out and that the new rationing equals the assignment if and only if the 
individual is on the long side of the market and the assignment constraints his 
effective excess demand. These adjustments of the perceived rationing schemes helps 
us to escape from getting stuck in an equilibrium with non-frictionless markets. 
Perceiving the new rationing scheme the individuals want to revise their 
effective demands. The effective demand of i will not change if the new rationing 
scheme (/c1,^1) for i coincides with the old rationing scheme (ll,Ll). If this holds for 
all agents i the assignments yield a neo-Keynesian or K-equilibrium (see Benassy 
(1975, 1982)). 
Definition 4.2. A K-equilibrium with respect to a price system p is a set of 
assignments z1 e Rn , and effective excess demand vectors ë1 e Rn , i = l,...,m, 
and a set of rationing schemes l1 e -Cl and L1 E ü, with /'Q = -oo and L JQ = oo, i = 
l,...,m, such that for all i and for j = l,...,n 
(a) e'1- = JfiW) - w ,^ 
(b) z^ = F^ë ) , 
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(c) /^ = g ^ ê ) and LJj = G ^ ë ) . 
Observe that at a K-equilibrium the expressed effective excess demands need 
not to be equal to the realized transactions after the assignments. If so, i.e., if z1- # 
ê1:, then we obtain from condition 5) that gVë) = z1: if ê1: < z1- and 
G1j(ë) = z1: if ê1: > z1:, and hence it follows from condition c) of Definition 
4.2 that zJj = lx- if ë*j < z'j and zJj = Lx- if ê1: > z1-. Moreover, if z1- = ë'j 
it follows from condition 4) and from condition c) of Definition 4.2 that l1-. < ë1: 
= z
1: < L1-. So, in equilibrium we have that for all i and j 
z^ = max(/ij, m i n ^ , Z,ij)) = zijC/i.i1). 
Hence, for all j the assignment z1- is equal to zl-All,Ll). Since Theorem 4.1 says that 
e'C/SL1) e ~E\ll,Ll), it follows that in a K-equilibrium for each consumer the vector 
of realized consumptions maximizes his utility in the constrained budget set and is 
equal to the constrained excess demand vector. Moreover condition 3) guarantees that 
agents on the short side can realize their effective excess demands. Together with 
condition 4) this implies that at a K-equilibrium all markets are frictionless. This 
gives us the next result. 
Corollarv 4.3. Let the set of transactions z1, effective excess demand vectors ë \ 
and rationing schemes {ll,Ll), i = l,...,m, be a K-equilibrium with respect to p. Then 
with p as the vector of fixed prices, the set of consumptions x1 defined by 
x
Jj = zVj + wJj, j = l,...,n and x'0 = wxQ - Ej pjZJj, i = l,...,m 
and the set of rationing schemes (f,1-}), i = l,...,m, constitute a constrained 
equilibrium with no quantity constraints on the numeraire commodity. 
The property of frictionless markets implies that a K-equilibrium is efficiënt 
market by market. That means that for a set of K-equilibrium transactions z1 with 
rationing schemes (Z1, L1), i = l,...,m, there is no other feasible set of transactions y1, 
i = l,...,m, yielding a higher utility for all agents, such that Ej y1 = 0 and there exists 
a j # 0 such that for all i and for all h # j , 
4 * yJh * L\-
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So, it is not possible to make all agents better off by a more efficiënt allocation of 
just one of the commodities 3 \ The market by market efficiency follows from the 
fact that for all i, z1 yields utility maximization under /*n < x1^ - w Jh < L1^ for all 
h, i.e., the realized consumption x1 is equal to the constrained demand of i. Indeed, 
when each agent i would be better off under an y1 yielding, for some j # 0, maximal 
utility under l1^ < y1^ < L1^ for all h # j , we must have that at the K-equilibrium 
all agents are constrained on market j while Ej y1: = 0. However, that contradicts the 
fact that there is only rationing on at most one side of the market. 
Below we prove the existence of a K-equilibrium and hence the existence of 
a constrained equilibrium. Observe that this proof needs the specification of the 
functions g1: and G1: for all i and j , see also the end of Section 6. 
Theorem 4.4. If for all i the functions g1 and G1 are continuous, then there exists a 
K-equilibrium. 
Proof: For given rationing scheme (Z1, L1) let x\j) maximize i's utility without taking 
into account the constraints on market j . Since x\j) e X1 we have that for all j , 
x l;(j) ^ 0, while the budget constraint implies that x!:(j) - w1- < b; with b- = max^ 
S h#i p h w l h / p i - H e n c e f ° r a11 i a n c l J ' t n e effective excess demand vectors ë1 with 
ê"1: = xVj) - wJj satisfy -w- < ê1: < b:. Let W be the subset of R n defined by 
W = { y 6 R n | - w j < y j < b j , j = l,...,n}, 
and let Wm = W x W x ... x W be the mn-dimensional cross product of m sets W. 
Furthermore, for y = (yl,....,ym) e Wm, let h^y) G R n be defined by 
h ^ y ) = e ^ y ) , G^y)) - w^, j = l,...,n, i = l,...,m. 
Clearly, h^y) G W. Since g1 and G1 are continuous functions, the strict quasi-
concavity of the utility functions implies that h = (h ,...,hm) is a continuous function 
m * 
from W into itself. According to Brouwer's fixed point theorem there exists a y in 
Wm such that h*(y ) = y x, i = l,...,m. Clearly, the effective demand vectors y 1 G 
n i * 
R , i = l,...,m, constitute a K-equilibrium with transactions F (y ) and rationing 
i * i * n 
schemes (g\y ), G'(y )), i = l,...,m. u 
' This does not exclude that there is a chain of traders (i ,...,i, ) and a chain of commodities (j ,...J, ), such 
that for all h = l,...,k, trader i, is constrained in the demand of good j , and not constrained in the supply of 
good ju ,-ii with h+1 = 1 if h = k. In such a case a Pareto improvement is possible by weakening for all h the 
constraint of consumer i, on the demand for good j , . 
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A K-equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 4.1 for two consumers, A and B, and 
two non-money commodities. In this figure the origin denotes the no trade situation. 
A R 
On the horizontal axis we have the variables z j to the right and z j to the left, and 
A R 
on the vertical axis the variables z 2 downwards and z 2 upwards. Consequently, 
A R 
each point z denotes a feasible trade with z = ( z j , ^ ) and z = ( - Z j ^ ) . If the 
transaction is carried out consumer i's utility equals u^x1) with x1- = w1: + z1-, j=l,2, 
and XJQ = WJQ - £= PjZ1:, i = A,B. So, for both i, the indifference curves I1 of i are 
curves around the point m1 reflecting the unconstrained optimal excess demand. At 
A R 
the optimal points m r t and m the excess demand of consumer A for commodity 1 
exceeds the excess supply of consumer B for that commodity, while for commodity 2 
the excess demand of consumer B exceeds the excess supply of consumer A. This 
leads to demand rationing on both markets. Let L j < m j be the demand rationing 
for A on the first market. Then, the effective excess demand for commodity 1 equals 
m j , because A does not take into account this rationing in determining his 
effective demand for commodity 1. However, the effective excess demand for 
commodity 2 becomes equal to the second (negative) component of the point which 
maximizes u (x ) under z j < L j , i.e., the effective excess demand for 
commodity 2 becomes equal to the second component of the point where an 
indifference curve of A is tangent to the line z j = L j . Let m (L j) be this 
point, then (m j ,m -^JL j)) is the effective excess demand of consumer A given 
A R R 
the rationing L j on the demand of commodity 1. Similarly, with m (L 2) t h e 
R R 
tangent point on the indifference curve of B tangent to the line z 2 - L 2* 
B B B 
(m |(L 2)>m 2^ 1S t n e e f f e c t i v e excess demand of consumer B given the rationing 
B R 
L 2 < m 2 o n t n e bemand of commodity 2. Given these effective demands, the 
R R A A R R 
assignments become (-m j(L 2)>m 2 ^ 1^ ^o r c o n s u m e r A a n ^ (m ](L 2)1" 
A A A R B 
m 2 ^ 1)) ^o r consumer B. An equilibrium is obtained if L j = -m j(L 2) a n ^ 
L B 2 = - m A 2 ( ^ A i ) , i-e., at the point K where the offer curves z A = m ^ Z ^ j ) , LAl 
R R R R 
> 0, and z - m (L 2)» L 2 ^ 0, intersect each other. 
Insert Figure 4.1. 
It should be observed that both agents prefer the point H above K. This 
shows that generally a K-equilibrium is not Pareto optimal nor even optimal with 
respect to the price system p. That means, given p, there exists feasible transactions 
y1, satisfying the budget constraint X'Q = WJQ - E: PjZ1: > 0, i = l,...,m, which are 
preferred by all agents above z1. 
The figure also suggests an iterative method to find a K-equilibrium. Let 
(L j , t j ) w i t n 0 ^ £ A i ^ m A j a n d 0 < Lr2 ^ m 2 ^ e a r a t i ° n m 8 scheme on the 
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excess demands for A and B on the commodities 1 and 2 respectively. Then the new 
rationing scheme becomes (K j , K ^) ^vith K j , the demand rationing for consumer 
A, equal to the assignment -m j(L -^ of commodity 1 to consumer B and with K 2 
equal to -m 2 ^ i)- Continuing this procedure leads to the K-equilibrium rationing 
scheme. However, generally, the iterative procedure (k1,^) = (g'(ê), G\e)) for 
all i, with e = (ë ,...,êm) the effective excess demands obtained for the 
previous rationing schemes (l1, L1), i = l,...,m, need not to converge to a set of K-
equilibrium rationing schemes. 
5. TvDoloev of K-eauilibria 
In a K-equilibrium we have for each market that there is either rationing on 
the demands, or rationing on the supplies, or no rationing at all. So, for each market 
there are three possibilities. This implies that for an economy with u non-money 
commodities the number of different regimes equals 3 n with 2 n of them having 
rationing on all markets. When all prices of the non-money commodities are very 
high, we have in general excess supply on all markets. On the other hand, there will 
be excess demand on all markets if all prices are very low. Intermediate cases occur 
when some of the prices are relatively high, and the others are relatively low. For the 
case with n=2 the different regimes in the price space are sketched in Figure 5.1. In 
region I with Pj and P2 rather high, there is supply rationing on both markets, while 
in region III both markets are in excess demand. In region II (IV), commodity 2 is in 
excess demand (supply) and commodity 1 in excess supply (demand). On the 
boundary between two regions we have rationing on only one market. The prices 
p 2 and p 2 a t t n e intersection point E of all regions are the Walrasian prices. For a 
numerical example we refer to Benassy (1975). 
Insert Figure 5.1. 
We will consider now the different regions in more detail. First we consider 
region I, in which there is supply rationing on both markets. If all agents are 
suppliers of both commodities, then no trade is feasible and a no trade equilibrium is 
achieved by setting / ' j = / ^ = 0 for all i. A more interesting case occurs when some 
of the agents are suppliers of commodity 1 and demanders of commodity 2, say type 
A agents, and some other agents, say type B agents are demanders of commodity 1 
and suppliers of commodity 2. Of course, for both commodities the total supply 
exceeds the total demand. Now, an equilibrium is achieved by setting rations Z*j (< 0) 
on the supplies of good 1 for the agents i of type A and rations /*2 (< 0) on the 
supplies of good 2 for the agents i of type B, such that the total effective demand of 
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the agents of type A (respectively B) for good 2 (respectively 1) equals the total 
rationed supply £ j e g l/^l of commodity 2 (respectively the total rationed supply 
s i e A l/1]! of commodity 1). Of course, the effective demand of agent i of type A 
(respectively B) for good 2 (respectively 1) depends on his ration /Xj (respectively 
l1^). Now, suppose agents of a third type, say type C, enter the scène with a demand 
for one of the commodities, say 1. The result is that agents of type A are able to sell 
more of commodity 1, so that their rations are weakened, i.e., the amounts \lx^\ 
become greater. This increases the budget of the agents of type A for commodity 2, 
and hence the demands for commodity 2 will increase. Now, the agents of type B are 
able to sell more of commodity 2, and this will result in an additional demand for 
commodity 1 of the agents of type B. In this way we get the multiplier effect. The 
initial rationings on the supplies of commodity 1 have nat only to be weakened to 
covering the demand of the agents of type C for commodity 1, but also to absorb the 
induced additional demand of the agents of type B for this commodity. Moreover, 
the initial rationings on the supplies of commodity 2 for the agents of type B have to 
be weakened to cover the induced additional demand for commodity 2 of the agents 
of type A. In cases of general excess supplies the government can therefore reduce 
the excess supplies (unemployment) by triggering off the multiplier effect through 
increasing their own demand for the commodities (i.e., extra government spendings). 
In the same way the government can reduce the excess demands by decreasing their 
demands if the economy is in a region III situation (general demand rationing). 
We now consider the case that the economy is in a region II (or analogously 
region IV) situation. In region II there is supply rationing on commodity 1 and 
demand rationing on commodity 2. So, the agents of type A are rationed in their 
supplies of commodity 1 and in their demands for commodity 2, whereas the agents 
of type B are not rationed at all. In this case an additional demand of agents of type 
C for commodity I does not induce a multiplier effect. The only result is that the 
agents of type A are able to sell more of commodity 1. This results in an additonal 
demand of these agents for commodity 2. However, the agents of type B are not 
constrained at all and therefore their supplies of commodity 2 do not change. So, the 
rationings on the demands of the agents of type A for commodity 2 have to stay on 
the same level. Therefore, the additional sale of commodity 1 by the agents of type 
A results in higher terminal holdings of money by these agents. 
A specific example of a two non-money commodity economy is the 
Barro/Grossman-Malinvaud model. This model has been described in full detail in 
Malinvaud (1977). In this model the two commodities are consumption good 
(commodity 1) and labour (commodity 2). There is one producer, which is an agent 
of type A, supplying the consumption good and demanding for labour. The agents of 
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type B are the consumers, who supply labour and have a demand for the 
consumption good. Moreover the consumers have initial holdings of money. Money 
has utility as a means to transfer utility from the current period to the next period. 
The government with a demand for the consumption good is an agent of type C. In 
region I with roughly speaking a high (commodity) price p and a high (labour) wage 
w, the producer is constrained in his supply of the consumption good and the 
consumers are constrained in their supplies of labour (i.e., unemployed). This region 
is called the region of Keynesian Unemployment. The unemployment can be reduced 
by increasing the demand of the government for the consumption good. In region III, 
with a relatively low price and a low wage, the producer is constrained in his 
demand for labour and the consumers in their demand for the consumption good. In 
this region of Repressed Inflation the constraints can be weakened by decreasing the 
government demand of the consumption good. In region IV, with a low price for the 
consumption good and a high labour wage, the producer is unconstrained, whereas 
the consumers are constrained in the demand for the consumption good and in the 
supply of labour. In this case a change of the government demand does not affect the 
unconstrained producer and only has an impact on the rationing of the consumers. 
This region is called the region of Classical Unemployment. Because the producer can 
not be rationed simultaneously on his demand for labour and his supply of the 
consumption good we do not have region II in this model. On the boundary between 
the regions I and II the producer is constrained in either the demand for labour or 
the supply of the consumption good. In more complicated models, for instance a 
multi-period model in which the producer can keep consumption goods in stock, a 
non-empty region II is possible and is called the region of Under-Consumption. The 
typical partition of the price/wage space for the Standard Malinvaud model without 
* * 
the possibility of underconsumption is sketched in Figure 5.2, in which p and w 
are the equilibrium prices. 
Insert Figure 5.2. 
6. Rationing schemes 
Until now we did not specify the rationing schemes. It should be clear, 
however, that the equilibrium allocation depends on the specific rationing scheme. 
Drèze (1975), for instance, uses a uniform rationing scheme where the constraints on 
market j do not depend on the identity of the agent, i.e., Z1 = / and Ll = L for all i. 
Other rationing schemes may serve as well. For supply rationing, Kurz (1982) 
introduced the notion of fractional rationing, i.e., for all i and j , l1- = -aw' j , with 0 
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< Q < 1. In this framework a is the fraction of the initial endowment which can not 
be offered for sale. In a stochastic framework a can be interpreted as the probability 
of becoming unemployed. For studies on stochastic rationing schemes we refer to e.g. 
Svensson (1980) and Wu (1985). Other examples of rationing are queueing and 
priority systems (see Benassy (1982, page 18)). Drazen (1980) argues that it is of 
secondary importance which specific agents face rationing as long as we are 
concerned with the aggregate constraint. It should be noticed, however, that the 
allocation of the shortages is crucial in determining whether an equilibrium is socially 
acceptable or not. 
Another example of rationing is proportional rationing (see Benassy (1982, 
page 19)). However, here the problem of manipulable rationing arises. A rationing 
scheme is non-manipulable if the assignments to agent i only depend on the 
expressed excess demands of the other agents. Under proportional rationing agents on 
the short side realize their demands, but agents on the long side receive an 
assignment proportional to their demand or supply. So, the assignment to agent i 
depends not only on the expressed excess demands of the other agents, but also on 
the excess demand expressed by himself. For example, for some market j , let d1 be 
the excess demand of agent i. Then D = Ej max (0, d1) is the total positive excess 
demand and S = S | max (0, -d1) the total positive excess supply. Under proportional 
rationing consumer i receives in case D > S 
z
1
 = d1 if d1 < 0 and z1 = d^S/D if d1 > 0 
and when D < S 
z
1
 = d1 if d1 > 0 and z1 = d^D/S if d[ < 0. 
It is obvious that under proportional rationing an agent has the possibility to 
break the constraint by overbidding. If all agents behave in this way, no equilibrium 
may exist. Clearly, the proportional rationing is not consistent with Drèze's concept 
of constrained equilibrium. In the latter the agents maximize their utility under the 
ex-ante given rationing scheme, while under proportional rationing the scheme is 
determined ex-post depending on the actual demands and supplies. Proportional 
rationing, however, easily fits in Benassy's framework of a K-equilibrium, because in 
a K-equilibrium the transactions depend on the effective demands through the 
assignment functions F1. Therefore, let us reconsider the K-equilibrium. In 
equilibrium, the actual transactions z1- = F ^ ë ) , j = l,...,n, of agent i occur given 
the effective excess demands ê" , h = l,...,m. Moreover, the rationing schemes 
(ll,Lx) satisfy I1- = z1- if z1: < ë1: and L1- = z1- if zl- > ë1-. Ex post, the realized 
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transactions maximize utility over the feasible transactions l1- < zl- < L1-, j = l,...,n. 
This characterization of a K-equilibrium shows that the binding constraints are 
determined through the assignment functions F1:. We have seen that given the 
rationing scheme (ll,Ll) for all agents i the effective demand ety1,!,1) is an element 
of ~El{ll,Ll), i.e., the consumption realized through the expected transactions zl-{ll,Ll) 
= maxC/1-, minCê1:., L1-)), j = l,...,n, maximizes i's utility. However, if the agent is 
aware of the fact that the rationing is determined through the assignments, he would 
not express an element of E1^1,!!1) as his excess demand, but an excess demand e1 
such that the consumption induced by the assignments z • = F :(e), j = l,...,n, 
yields maximization of his utility, where e , h # i, are agent i's expectations 
about the expressed demands of the other agents. In other words, agent i expresses 
Aj 
effective demands e :, j = l,...,n, such that the consumption induced by 
z
xj = maxCg^Ce), m i n ^ j , G^e))) , 
j = l,...,n, maximizes his utility. So, the agent will not maximize his utility under the 
given rationing scheme {Jl,Ll), but under the expected new rationing scheme 
(g^e), G^e)). If the rationing functions gJ and G1 are manipulable, i.e., they 
Aj 
depend on the effective demand e expressed by agent i, and if all agents behave 
in this way, then the effective demands can not longer be restricted to belong to a 
bounded set and the fixed point argument can not be applied to prove Theorem 4.4. 
So, the rationing functions g1 and G1 should only depend on the expressed demands 
of the other agents. 
7. Existence of constrained equilibria 
In Section 4 the existence of a Drèze equilibrium, i.e., a constrained 
equilibrium without quantity constraints on the numeraire commodity, has been 
proved through proving the existence of a K-equilibrium. This proof uses a fixed 
point argument in the mn-dimensional space Wm. We noticed already that the 
iterative adjustment of the quantity constraints does not need to converge to an 
equilibrium. If not, we have to solve a system of equations to compute an 
equilibrium. In this case it is of great help to lower the dimension of the problem. 
Therefore we give a direct proof of the existence of a constrained equilibrium. The 
direct proof given in this section is based on the existence of fixed points in some 
appropiate (n+l)-dimensional set. Moreover, this type of proof allows for more 
general sets of admissible prices, while also the existence of other types of 
constrained equilibria can be proved, in particular the existence of a supply-
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constrained equilibrium. Finally, we do not need to specify the constraint functions 
g* and G1. 
Instead of commodity 0 we allow in this section for an arbitrarily chosen 
commodity as the numeraire commodity and hence we assume that the set of 
admissible prices is given by 
P = {p G n | 0 < rjj < p: < p: < oo for all j}. 
For an a-priori chosen numeraire commodity h we say that a constrained equilibrium 
is a Drèze equilibrium with respect to h if commodity h is not rationed. Van der 
Laan (1980) considered a model without an a-priori chosen numeraire commodity. In 
this case the existence of a supply-constrained or unemployment equilibrium can be 
proved. If at an unemployment equilibrium commodity h is not rationed, then ex 
post commodity h can be chosen as the numeraire commodity and the equilibrium is 
ex post a supply-constrained Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity h. 
To prove the existence of a Drèze or an unemployment equilibrium we 
construct an excess demand function z for which each zero point yields a constrained 
equilibrium. Then we show that there do exist zero points of z for which the 
corresponding equilibria are Drèze or unemployment equilibria. For simplicity we 
assume uniform rationing schemes (l,L) in the remaining of this paper. Let Q be the 
(n+l)-dimensional subset of O given by 
Q = { q e n | 0 < q < 2 p } . (7.1) 
For q G Q, let p(q) G P, /(q) G -ü, and L(q) G n be defined by 
Pj(q) = max {p_j, min(pj,qj)}, j - 0,...,n, (7.2) 
/j(q) = -min (1, qj/p_j}Wj, j = 0,...,n, (7.3) 
Lj(q) = min {1, 2 - QJ/PJ}WJ, j = 0,...,n. (7.4) 
The functions P:(q), /:(q), L-(q) are illustrated in Figure 7.1. Observe that p_-
< Qj < Pj implies Pj(q) = qj, /j(q) = -Wj, and Lj(q) = Wj. When qj > Pj, then 
Pj(q) = Pj, /j(q) = -Wj, and Lj(q) = (2 - QJ/PJ)WJ < Wj. When qj < p_j then Pj(q) 
= Ej, /j(q) = -qjWj/fij > -Wj, and Lj(q) = Wj. 
Insert Figure 7.1. 
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Let x\q), i = l,...,m, be the utility maximizing consumption of consumer i in the 
budget set 
BJ(q) = {xGX11 pT(q)x < pT(q)wi, /(q) < x-w1 < L(q)} 
and let z(q) = Ej(x1(q)-w1). From the assumptions A | , A2 and A3 it follows that x1 is 
a continuous function of q and satisfies pT(q)x*(q) = pT(q)w1, i=l,...,m. Hence, z is a 
continuous function from Q into R satisfying pT(q)z(q) = 0 for all q G Q. Observe 
that q: = 0 implies /:(q) = 0 and hence Zj(q) > 0, while q= = 2p- implies L-(q) = 0 
and hence Zj(q) < 0. 
* 5 * 
Lemma 7.1. A zero point q of z induces a constrained equilibrium x (q ), i=l,...,m, 
P(q ), /(q ), and L(q ). 
+ • * • 
Proof: By construction we have p(q ) e P, /(q ) e -fi, L(q ) G n, and for all i x*(q ) 
: * * * * : * : 
= d (p(q ), /(q ), L(q )). Further, since z(q ) = 0, we obtain Dj x (q ) = w. With z (q) 
i i * 
the excess demand x (q) - w at q of agent i, we have that at a zero point q of z the 
excess demand of agent i of commodity j satisfies 
-w: < -w1- < zJ:(q ) < w- - w1- < w-. 
By construction, /-(q) > -w- implies P:(q) = p.: and L:(q) = w=, while L:(q) < w= 
implies p:(q) = p= and /-(q) = -Wj. Hence at a zero point q of z, x*(q ), i = 
* r * 
l,...,m, p(q ), /(q ), and L(q ) satisfy all the conditions of Definition 3.1. O 
If z(q ) = 0 and n^ < q ^ < P^, then at the constrained equilibrium induced 
* * 
by q commodity h is not rationed. In fact Q h - Ph i m P^ e s t n a t t n e demand of 
commodity h is not rationed, while q ^ > p.^ implies that the supply is not rationed. 
Hence we have the following corollaries. 
* * 
Corollarv 7.2. When for some h, h G {0,...,n}, p.^ < q
 h < p h , then a zero point q 
of z yields a Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity h. 
Corollarv 7.3. A constrained equilibrium induced by a zero point q of z yields an 
* * _ 
unemployment equilibrium if there exists an h with Eh - q h - ph anc* q j - pi 
for all j # h. 
The next lemma says that any one of the counting variables q= can be chosen 
freely, in the sense that if one of these variables is given an a-priori value, there 
exists a zero point of z for which that variable has this value. In fact, if for some j , 
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q- is fixed,- then it is possible to determine the other variables q^, h # j , such that 
all markets h # j are in equilibrium. Since for all q we have pT(q)z(q) = 0 (Walras' 
law), market j must be in equilibrium if all markets h + j are in equilibrium. 
A A 
Lemma 7.4. For each qh , 0 < qh < 2ph , h e {0,...,n}, there exists a zero point 
* * A 
q of z such that q ^ = qh. 
Proof: Let the continuous function f from Q to Q be defined by 
fj(q) = max (0, min (2pj, qj + Zj(q))), j * h, 
A 
and fj^q) = qjj. According to Brouwer's fixed point theorem there exists a point 
q in Q such that f(q ) = q . Clearly, Q h = %• Suppose that for some j •# h, q • 
= 2p- (respectively = 0), then z-(q ) < 0 (respectively > 0), and hence f-(q ) = q : J
*
 J
 * * * ' *
J 
implies Zj(q ) = 0. When for some j # h, 0 < q : < 2p-, then f-(q ) = q • + z=(q ) 
* * * • 
and hence z=(q ) = 0. Consequently, the fixed point q of f implies that z:(q ) = 0 
for all j # h. Together with Walras' law and the fact that a^ > 0 this implies that 
also zfl(q ) = 0 and hence q is a zero point of z. O 
Theorem 7.5. For each h, there exists a Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity 
h. 
Proof: Set q^ such that rj^ < q^ < p^. The theorem follows from Corollary 
7.2 and Lemma 7.4. O 
The existence of an unemployment equilibrium follows immediately from the 
next lemma, which says that for each a-priori chosen S, 0 < 6 < 1, there exists a zero 
point q of z on the upper boundary of the box 
Q5 = {q 6 Q | maxh q h /2p h < 5}. 
Thus, max^ qj1/2pj1 is now taken fixed instead of giving one of the variables an a 
priori chosen value. 
* 
Lemma 1.6. For each 5, 0 < 8 < 1, there exists a zero point q in Q of z such that 
* 
maxj q j /2pj = S. 
Proof: For 5 = 1, q = 2p yields the trivial equilibrium x\q ) = w1 for all i, /(q ) 
= -w, L(q ) = 0, and p(q ) - p, and hence z(q ) = 0. So, suppose that 0 < 8 < 1. 
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For all q e Q5, let r(q) be the intersection of the set {q e Q | maxj q:/2p: = 5} and 
the line segment from q to 2p. So, r(q) = (1-A(q))q + A(q)2p, where 
A(q) = (52ph - qh)/(2ph - qh) 
with h an index such that q^^ p^ = max: q:/2pj, see Figure 7.2. 
Insert Figure 7.2. 
By construction r(q) = q if q}j/2pn = S and r=(q) > q: for all j if q n /2p h < S. 
Let the continuous function f from Qg to Q^ be defined by 
fj(q) = max (0, min (52pj, rj(q) + Zj(q))), j = 0,...,n. 
* 
Again according to Brouwer's fixed point theorem there exists a point q in Qg such 
* * * 4e % 
that f(q ) = q . Suppose that max: q ;/2p: < 6, and hence rj(q ) > q : for all j . 
* *
 J
*
, J J
*
J 
Because q : = f:(q ) this implies z=(q ) < 0 for all j . Since p:(q ) > rj- > 0 for all j 
J J J * J J * _ 
this contradicts Walras' law. Hence the fixed point q of f satisfies max: q -/2p- = 
* * _ 
5. It remams to prove that z:(q ) = 0 for all j . Since max- q ;/2p: = S implies 
r(q ) = q , we obtain 
q j = max (0, min (52pj, q j + Zj(q ))), j = 0,...,n. 
* * * * * 
If for some j we have q : = 0, then z-(q ) > 0 and hence f:(q ) = q : implies z-(q ) = 
* * * * * 
0. If 0 < q j < 52p=, then f:(q ) = q : implies zj(q ) = 0. Finally, if q : = 52p:, 
then f-(q ) = q • implies Z:(q ) > 0. Again from Walras' law and the fact that p:(q ) 
J J J
 * * *
 J 
> 0 this implies that also z:(q ) = 0 if q : = 52p-, and hence q is a zero point of O 
z.
 u 
Theorem 7.7. There exists an unemployment equilibrium, such that there is an 
unrationed commodity h with price equal to p^. 
Proof: Take S = 1/2. From Lemma 7.6 it follows that there exists a zero point q of z 
such that max: q ;/2p: = 1/2. So, at q there exists an index h such that 
*
 J J J
 * * 
q
 n/2pjj = 1/2, implying that q ^ = p n and hence pn(q ) = p^. Moreover, 
we have q : < p: for all j # h, implying that there is no rationing on the demands. Q 
It should be observed that the rationing is completely determined by q 
through (7.3) and (7.4). By taking continuous individual constraint functions /':(q) 
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and L'jCq) satisfying /^(q) = 0 if qj = 0, /\j(q) < - w\j if
 q j > ü-, L[-(q) = 0 if q- = 
2.pj, and LX:(q) > w- if q- < Pj, the existence of constrained equilibria can be 
proved under non-uniform rationing. 
As mentioned already in the proof of Lemma 7.6, we have that for 5 = 1, q 
= 2p yields the trivial equilibrium with L = 0, i.e., with complete rationing of all 
* 
the demands. Also, for S = 0, q = 0 is the unique element in QQ and yields the 
trivial equilibrium with complete rationing of all the supplies. 
We have seen that due to Walras' law there is one degree of freedom in the 
set Q of variables determining the prices and the rationing schemes. When defining 
the function h from Q to R by h:(q) = P:(q)z:(q), j = 0,...,n, we have that h and z 
are equivalent in the sense that z(q ) = 0 if and only if h(q ) = 0. Clearly, because of 
Walras' law, E: h-(q) =0 and hence h is a continuous function from the (n+1)-
dimensional set Q to the n-dimensional set 
S = {y e R n + 1 | Sj
 Yj = 0}. 
In general we have because of the implicit function theorem that for a continuously 
differentiable function h: Q —» S and a regular value c G S of h, the set h (c) is a 
disjoint union of paths and loops. Each path or loop is a one-dimensional manifold. 
A loop is a closed cycle and has no end points, while a path has two end points on 
the boundary of Q. We have seen that the function h: Q —• S has two zero points on 
* * 
the boundary of Q, namely q = 0 and q = 2p, corresponding to the two trivial 
equilibria. Now, assume that z-(q) > 0 if both q- = 0 and there exists an h with q^ > 
0. This assumption says that there is a positive excess demand for commodity j if it 
cannot be offered for sale (q: = 0 implies /:(q) = 0) and at least one other commodity 
can be offered for sale. So, at least one consumer wants to buy some amount of 
commodity j . Also, assume that z-(q) < 0 if both q- = 2j5: and there exists an h 
with q^ < 2p^. Under these assumptions q = 0 and q = 2p are the only two 
zero points of h on the boundary of Q. So, if 0 e S is a regular value of h and h is 
continuously differentiable, then h (0) contains just one path. This path runs from 0 
to 2p. The existence of such a path proves immediately both Lemma 7.4 and 
Lemma 7.6. Indeed, a path from q = 0 to q = 2p crosses at least once the set {q e 
Q | qh = Qh} for any 0 < qh < 2ph, h e {0,...,n}, as well as the upper boundary 
of Qr for any 0 < 5 < 1. Ho wever, the reverse is not true, i.e., the Lemmas 7.4 and 
7.6 do not prove the existence of a path connecting 0 and 2p. On the contrary, 
there are severe difficulties in proving the existence of such a path. From Sard's 
theorem it follows that if h is continuously differentiable almost every c 6 S is a 
regular value of h and hence we could assume that the vector of zeros is a regular 
value of h. However, h is in general not continuously differentiable. This follows 
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immediately from the fact that p:(q) is not differentiable at points q where q- equals 
p_: or p;. Moreover, Zj(q) is not differentiable at a point q at which a consumer 
switches from not being rationed to becoming rationed in commodity j . Nevertheless, 
using simplicial approximation theory (e.g. see van der Laan (1982) and van der Laan 
and Talman (1987)) we can prove the following theorem. 
Theorem 7.8. For any e > 0, there exists a path of points H£ in Q with end points q 
= 0 and q = 2p, such that 
maxj |hj(q)| < e 
for any q e H£. 
So, for any e > 0, there exists a path of approximating zero points of h with 
accuracy equal to e. Since |h:(q)| < e implies |z:(q)| < e/p- it follows that there is a 
path of approximating zero points of z connecting 0 and 2p, and hence a path of 
approximating constrained equilibria connecting the two trivial equilibria. In the 
sequel, if we speak about the path H of (constrained) equilibria we mean the path of 
approximating equilibria induced by the points on the path He of approximating zero 
points of z for an arbitrarily small e > 0. 
8. Supplv-constrained versus demand-constrained equilibria 
In the previous section we proved the existence of an unemployment or 
supply-constrained equilibrium. Analogously the existence of a demand-constrained 
equilibrium can be proved. Instead of doing so, let us consider the path H of 
equilibria connecting the two trivial equilibria. Without loss of generality, we say that 
there is supply rationing on commodity j if q: < 12: and hence /: > -w- and that there 
is demand rationing on commodity j if q: > p- and hence L- < w-. Observe that 
commodity rationing defined in this way does not imply rationing of the consumers 
in that commodity; it only means that it may occur that a consumer is rationed in 
that commodity. 
Going along the path H from 0 to 2p we have that for each j the variable 
q= goes from 0 to 2p:, all passing the interval [p:, p:]. If q: < p_: we have that 
l- > -w- and L- = wj, and hence commodity j is rationed on the supply side. 
Furthermore, p_: < q= < p: implies that /: = -w; and L- = w-, and hence commodity 
j is not rationed at all. Finally, for q= > p- we have that /: = -w; and L- < w-, so 
that commodity j is rationed on the demand side. So, for all q on the path close to 0, 
namely for q with q: < p.; for all j , we have supply rationing on each market, while 
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for all q close to 2p, namely with q = > p- for all j , we have demand rationing 
on each market. Going along the path from 0 to 2p each market switches therefore 
first from supply rationing to no rationing and eventually to demand rationing. Going 
along the path H and starting at q = 0, let h be the first index for which q^ becomes 
equal to Ë^ , say at point q". Then q~ yields a supply-constrained equilibrium with no 
rationing of commodity h. This equilibrium is also a Drèze equilibrium with 
commodity h as the ex post chosen numeraire. On the other hand, let q+ be a point 
on the path such that there is an index k with qk = p^ and q: > p- for all j#k. 
It follows from the discussion above that such a point exists on the path of equilibria. 
Then q+ yields a demand-constrained equilibrium with commodity k unrationed 4'. It 
is also a Drèze equilibrium with commodity k as the ex post chosen numeraire. As 
argued above, for any j there exists a point q on the path such that fi: < q: < p=. 
Such a point yields a Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity j as the 
unrationed ex post chosen numeraire commodity. For all other commodities there is 
either demand rationing or supply rationing or neither. For j = h we have an 
equilibrium with supply rationing on the other commodities, for j = k we have an 
equilibrium with demand rationing on the other commodities 5 ' . Roughly speaking, 
we may say that, relative to the Walrasian price system, commodity h has the lowest 
price and commodity k has the highest price. To conclude this discussion, let us 
consider the case that along the path H, q= increases monotonically for all j , and that 
at any point q along H at most one variable q- lies in the interval [p_:, Pj]. The 
latter is in general true if for all j , p_; is close or equal to pj. In this case there is 
an ordering IQ (=h), i j , . . . , in_j, in (=k) of the indices 0,...,n, such that for all j at the 
induced Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity i.-, the commodities i:+j,...,in 
are supply constrained and the commodities iQ,...,i- j are demand constrained, so that 
along the path H all markets switch successively in this order from supply to demand 
rationing. 
The motivation behind the proof of a supply-constrained equilibrium lies in 
the idea that demand rationing rarely occurs in market economies whereas supply 
rationing is very common. Clearly, pure existence does not explain why supply-
constrained equilibria should occur more frequently than demand-constrained 
equilibria. We return to this topic in Section 10. Another problem in the theory of 
supply-constrained equilibria has been raised by Dehez and Drèze (1984). They argue 
that in an economy with money, it is more realistic to choose money a priori as the 
unrationed numeraire commodity, since quantity constraints on net trades of money 
j] 
' A formal proof of the existence of a demand-constrained equilibrium goes along the lines of the existence 
proof of a supply-constrained equilibrium. 
' However, observe that nothing has bi 
demand-constrained equilibria may occur. 
5) een said about unicity, so that also other supply-constrained or 
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are very rarely observed. By definition, a supply-constrained equilibrium excludes 
the possibility of an a priori chosen numeraire commodity. In other words, rationing 
of money may happen in a supply-constrained equilibrium. Dehez and Drèze 
however provided sufficiënt conditions for the existence of a supply-constrained 
equilibrium with no rationing on an a priori chosen always desired numeraire 
(money). In fact, it is sufficiënt and necessary to allow for flexible money prices. 
9. Flexible monev prices 
In this section we consider a simplified version of the Dehez-Drèze model 6) 
(see also van der Laan (1984)). This simplification does not affect the generality of 
the results. In the model, the relative prices of the non-money commodities are 
bounded by upper and lower bounds. In the extreme case that the upper bounds are 
equal to the lower bounds, we have that for each pair of non-money commodities the 
ratio of the prices is fixed, but the level of these prices with respect to the price of 
money is not fixed. The price level of the non-money commodities is determined by 
a price index, which is determined by the prices of the index commodities. This set 
of index makers is a subset of the set of commodities other than money. Under 
certain restrictions on the prices of the index commodities, there exists a supply-
constrained equilibrium such that money is not rationed. 
The money commodity, indexed by j = 0, is again used as the numeraire 
commodity and its price is set equal to 1. The set I of index commodities is a subset 
of {l,...,n} and defines a price index 7r(p) = 7r(p-, jel) . This index determines the 
level of the prices of all the non-money commodities j , j = l,...,n. The price index 
function ir is assumed to be continuous in p and homogeneous of degree one, i.e., 
jr(ap) = ajr(p) for all a > 0. The relative prices of the non-money commodities, 
i.e., the ratios between the prices of the commodities and the price index, are 
* 
restncted. So, the set P of admissible prices is given by 
P = {p G n | pQ = 1, 7r(p)rjj < Pj < 7r(p)pj, j=l,...,n), 
with 0 < JT(P_:, jel) < 1 < 7r(p;, jel) and 0 < p_j < p= < oo for all j . The latter 
restrictions ensure that P is not empty. 
As an example, let n = 2 with commodity j = 1 labour and commodity j = 2 a 
consumption good. In case of price indexation for the wages the level of the wages 
will depend on the price of the consumption good. We have then that I = {2}, and for 
* 
instance the price index jr(p) = P2- Hence the price set P is equal to 
In the model of Dehez and Drèze there is also a production sector. 
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P = {p e R+ 3 | p 0 = 1, p2ni < p ! < P 2 P I ) , 
i.e., the ratio between the price of labour and the price of the consumption good is 
bounded, and fixed if p_j = Pj. Observe that the restriction P2E2 ^ P2 ^ P2*>2 *s 
* 
redundant, because the non-emptiness of P requires that p_2 < 1 and p 2 > 1. 
Normalizing the prices by setting jr(p) = 1 instead of pg = 1 we obtain the 
equivalent set of prices 
P' = (p e n | pQ > 0, rjj < Pj < pj, j=l,...,n, and 7r(p) = 1}. 
* 
Clearly, because of the homogeneity of TT we have that if 7r(p) > 0 then p e P 
A l * 1 
implies that p = ir (p)p e P'. Also, if PQ > 0 then p e P' implies p = pg p e 
* 1 1 
P , since i"(Pg~ P) = Pg by the fact that JT is homogeneous and jr(p) = 1 for p e 
P'. 
We have seen in the previous sections that in a constrained equilibrium supply 
rationing is only allowed if the price is on its lower bound. However, without further 
assumptions this complementarity condition between rationing and price binding can 
not be guaranteed to hold when dealing with the set P'. Since 7r(p) is restricted to be 
equal to one, the prices of the index makers can not reach the lower bounds 
simultaneously if 7r(p_j, jel) < 1. So, excess supply can not enforce minimum prices 
for all index makers simultaneously, unless 7r(p_j, jel) = 1. Therefore in the following 
we consider the case that the lower bounds rjj satisfy 7r(rj-, jel) = 1. Assuming that 
A A A J J 
TT(P) > TT(P) if p > p and p: > p- for at least one j e I, p > p. and 7r(p) = 
1 for all p implies that p: = p_- for all j e l , and hence that the index makers have 
fixed prices P: = E; = Pj-
Under the assumptions of Section 2, we are now able to state the following 
result, which strengthens the result of Dehez and Drèze in the sense that they proved 
Theorem 9.1 with in iii) /: < 0 instead of /: = -w-. Recall that in an unemployment 
equilibrium there is no demand rationing, i.e., L- = 00 for all j . 
Theorem 9.1. If p : = p- for all j e I, then there is an unemployment equilibrium 
with allocation x1, i = l,...,m, a rationing scheme / < 0, and a price p e P', such that 
i) /0 = - w0, 
ii) for all j , pj > pj implies Ij = -wj, 
iii) for at least one j # 0, pj = pj and Ij = -wj. 
For the proof of this theorem we refer to van der Laan (1984). 
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The theorem says that in case of fixed prices of the index makers there exists 
a supply-constrained equilibrium with no rationing on the money commodity and no 
rationing on at least one other commodity. In fact, there is an equilibrium in which 
the price of an unrationed non-money commodity is on its upper bound. 
The opposite case of fixed prices for the index commodities is the case that 
the prices of the index commodities are free, i.e., p_: = 0 and p= = oo for all j 6 1. 
However, to prove existence in this case, we need some restrictions on the price 
index function 7r(p) (see Weddepohl (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion). Here we 
restrict ourselves to the case that ?r(p) = Ej6 j p-. The set of admissible prices then 
becomes 
P" - {p e n f p 0 > 0, E J G I Pj = 1, nj < Pj < Pj, j € lu{0}}. 
with E- > 0 for all j £ lu{0}. For technical reasons we assumed until now that p_- > 0 
for all j . This assumption guarantees that - p T / is positive for all / < 0 with /• < 0 for 
at least one non-money commodity j . By assumption A3 of Section 2 this implies that 
for all i, S: PjinaxCw1-,-/;) > 0, i.e., each consumer has a positive income, which is a 
necessary condition for the continuity of the excess demand functions. However, to 
guarantee the continuity of the excess demand functions in the present case it is 
sufficiënt that - p T / > 0 for all / < 0 with h < 0 for some j € lu{0} or /: < 0 for all j 
e I, which will be true if p_; > 0 for all j € lu{0} and E j e I p: = 7r(p) = 1 for all p. 
We now have the following theorem. 
Theorem 9.2. There is an unemployment equilibrium with allocation x1, i = l,...,m, a 
rationing scheme / e -ft, and a price p E P", such that 
i) /0 = " w0, 
ii) for all j € Iu{0), p- > p_- implies /: = -w-, 
iii) there is an index j € lu{0} with p: = p- and /: = -Wj, or for all j G I, 
' j = - W j -
For the proof we refer again to van der Laan (1984). 
The theorem says that in the case of free prices for the index makers there 
exists a supply-constrained equilibrium such that money is not rationed and moreover 
at least one of the non-index commodities is not rationed or all index makers are not 
rationed. From the viewpoint of rationing, the index makers can be seen as a 
composite commodity with price jr(p) = 1. As long as all the non-index commodities 
and some of the index makers are rationed, adjusting of the prices and amounts of 
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rationing is possible until all index makers are not rationed anymore or at least one 
of the non-index makers is unrationed and has its price on the upper bound. 
Kurz (1982) considered a set of admissible prices P m defined as 
P m = {p e fi | p 0 + S j G l P j = 1, P j = tfj(ph,h€l), j C lu{0}}. 
If for j <£ lu{0}, p_j = Pj = Pj, and when ^j(ph,hel) = PjE h G l P h , the sets 
P" and P m are equivalent since P/(Po+ sh€l ph^ *s m P m ^ P € p " a n c I P/( sheI ph^ 
is in P" if p e P m . Kurz proved the existence of an unemployment equilibrium with 
possibly rationing on the supply of money. The formulation of P" instead of P m 
however, enables us to exclude rationing of money supplies. So, Theorem 9.2 
strengthens Kurz's result by stating that money is not rationed. On the other hand, it 
extends the result of Dehez and Drèze to economies with free relative prices of the 
index makers. 
Further results on supply-constrained equilibria can be found in Wu (1985) 
and Weddepohl (forthcoming). 
10. A rationale for supplv-constrained equilibria 
In Section 8 we showed that in a non-money economy each commodity can 
be chosen as the numeraire commodity for a Drèze equilibrium. If along the path H 
of equilibria in the set Q for all j the variable q: increases monotonically, there is an 
ordering iQ,i j , . . . . , in l , in of the indices 0,...,n, such that for all j at the Drèze 
equilibrium with respect to commodity i: as the numeraire commodity, the 
commodities i:+j,...,in are not demand constrained and the commodities iQ,...,i- j are 
not supply constrained. This does not explain why supply-constrained equilibria 
should occur more frequently than demand-constrained equilibria. However, the 
situation differs for a money economy with flexible money prices. To illustrate this, 
without loss of generality we restrict ourselves to the case that for all j , E: = P: = 
* *
 J 
p •. Since p_ and p satisfy 7r(p_) < 1 and 7r(p) > 1 we have that 7r(p ) = 1 and 
hence the price set P' defined in Section 9 becomes 
F = {p e n | p 0 > 0, Pj = p*j, j=l,...,n}. 
Equivalent to this set of prices is the set 
* i * 
P = {p e f21 PQ = 1 and for some a > 0, p- = ap •, j = I,...,n}, 
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Theorem 9.1 says that for this set of prices there exists a supply-constrained 
equilibrium with no rationing on the money commodity and no rationing on at least 
one non-money commodity. On the other hand, it is easy to see that for a close to 
zero all markets will be in excess demand. This is illustrated in Figure 10.1, in which 
* 
the set of prices P has been drawn in the partitioned space of prices (pj , P2) 
according to Figure 5.1. Figure 10.1 shows that the economy is in the regime of 
a) demand rationing on both markets for a < a ; 
b) demand rationing on market 1 and no rationing on market 2 for a = a , 
c) demand rationing on market 1 and supply rationing on market 2 for a < 
a < a ; 
d) no rationing on market 1 and supply rationing on market 2 for a = a , 
e) supply rationing on both markets for a > a . 
Insert Figure 10.1. 
The existence of an equilibrium according to case d) has been proved in Theorem 9.1 
7
'. However, we see that for case b) we have the analoguous result for a demand-
constrained equilibrium. In fact, going from very low values of a to very high values 
of Q all markets switch from demand constrained markets to supply constrained 
markets. In case that the number of markets with supply rationing is non-decreasing 
when a increases, there is an ordering i j ^ ....,in of the indices l,...,n and an 
increasing sequence of positive numbers a^, k = l,2,...,n, such that at prices p: = 
* . . . 
a k p i' J = * ' ' " ' n ' m a r ' c e t *k 1S unrationed, the markets ij,...ijc_j are supply 
constrained, and the markets i^+j,...,in are demand constrained. So, again demand 
rationing is as reasonable as supply rationing. However, when the ratio between the 
prices of the non-money commodities are fixed, but the price level is flexible, it is 
not unlikely that the price level will move upwards as long as some markets are in 
excess demand. This corresponds to the idea that downward price rigidities are 
stronger than upward price rigidities. Indeed, the economy tends to a supply-
constrained equilibrium if the price level goes upwards under excess demands for 
some commodities. This explanation requires to reconsider the partitioning of the 
non-money commodities in price making and price following commodities. When 
assuming that the price level goes up as long as there is demand rationing, the 
commodities in excess demand are the price makers and the commodities in excess 
supply are the price following commodities. 
_ 
' In case of the Malinvaud model with a fixed ratio between the price of the consumption good and the wage 
of labour, such a supply-constrained equilibrium lies either on the border between the regions of classical and 
Keyneeian unemployment with the consumers constrained in their supply of labour, or on the boundary 
between the regions of repressed inflation and Keynesian unemployment with the producer constrained in his 
supply of the consumption good. 
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11. Unemployment compensation 
We have seen that in an economy with non-Walrasian prices equilibrium of 
demand and supply can be reached through supply rationing. Indeed, in the real 
world supply rationing frequently occurs. Unemployment is a well-known example. 
However, knowing that there exists an unemployment equilibrium does not help 
unemployed people very much. To be unemployed has very serious social and 
economie impacts. The impact of unemployment on social life is hardly to overcome. 
In fact, in many cases only getting a job helps. In this sense job sharing may be of 
great help. The distribution of jobs over people is determined by the rationing 
scheme. In our framework we call someone unemployed (or supply-constrained) on 
market h if he wants to work more (or if he wants to sell more) than the rationing 
amount |/^|. So, we do not make a difference between the case of total unemployment 
(i.e., / h = 0) and the case of underemployment (i.e., /^ # 0). In both cases there is a 
loss of utility due to the constraint. Of course, the loss of utility in the case of 
unemployment will be higher than the loss of utility in the case of underemployment. 
In this section we consider a model in which this loss of utility is compensated by 
unemployment doles or other subsidies for unemployed people. This results in a 
model of an economy in which an agent perceives quantity constraints on his net 
sales, and receives an unemployment compensation for the loss of utility due to the 
constraints on the supplies. The unemployment compensations are financed by 
levying taxes. We assume that there is some institution or a government which 
collects the taxes and distributes the tax revenues among unemployed consumers 
through lump-sum compensations. It is not our purpose to discuss tax models, but we 
are only concerned about the existence of equilibria with unemployment 
compensations. We first consider a model in which the tax is only levied on net 
purchases. 
Let us consider an economy with n+1 commodities and a set of admissible 
prices 
P = (P e n | P.j < Pj < Pj for all j}, 
with for all j , 0 < p_; < P; < °°, i-e., an economy without money or an a priori 
chosen numeraire eommodity. To finance unemployment compensations we introducé 
taxes on net purchases. So, a tax vector is a vector t e n . Given a consumption x1, 
the tax to be paid by consumer i equals tT(x1-w1)+ = E- t:(x1-w1)+j with a+: = max(0, 
a:). Given a price p e P, a rationing scheme / < 0, a sales tax vector t > 0, and a 
lump-sum compensation s1, the budget set of consumer i becomes 
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B'Cp,/,^1) = {x G X11 pTx + t^x-w1)"1" < pTwi + s\ l < x - w1}. 
So, the consumer i is rationed in his supplies, pays (indirect) taxes on his net 
purchases, and receives a lump-sum compensation s1. 
Definition 11.1. A compensated unemployment equilibrium is an allocation x1, i = 
l,...,m, a rationing scheme / e -Q, a tax vector t e fi, a price vector p e P, and a set 
of compensations s \ i = l,...,m, such that 
a) x1 maximizes u1 on B1(p,/,t,s1), i = l,...,m, 
b) Ej (x1 - w1) = 0 and Ej t^x^w1)4" = E; s1, 
c) for all j , t: > 0 implies x • - w • > /• for all i, and x = - w ; = /: for some 
h implies t: = 0, 
d) for all j , p : < p: implies t: - 0, and p= > p_; implies /• < x1: - w1- for all 
i, 
e) for all i, u^x1) = u^x1), where x1 maximizes u1 in B^Pj-WjtjO). 
Condition b) states that all markets are in equilibrium and that the total tax revenue 
equals the total amount of compensations. Observe that if all markets are in 
equilibrium the latter follows from the fact that utility maximization implies that the 
optimal consumption is on the budget line and hence the value of the total excess 
demands plus the total tax revenue is equal to the total amount of compensations. 
Condition c) states that on each market not simultaneously supplies are constrained 
and a positive tax is levied on the net purchases. This complementarity between taxes 
and constraints implies that there is just one instrument on each market to equate 
demand and supply. Condition d) guarantees that there is no tax levied if the price is 
not on its upper bound and that there is no supply rationing if the price is not on its 
lower bound. Observe that both conditions correspond to the conditions c) and d) of 
a constrained equilibrium. Condition e) determines the unemployment compensation. 
The compensation for consumer i is such that the loss of utility due to the supply 
constraints is just compensated by the subsidy s1, i.e., the optimal consumption in the 
unconstrained budget set with zero compensation is equally preferred by agent i to 
the optimal consumption in the constrained budget set with income compensation s1 
8>. 
' Observe that preferences are defined on the consumption set X , i.e, utility only depends on consumption, 
including leisure. In case utility also depends on whether or not having a job, the existence of an 
unemployment compensation satisfying condition e) can not be guaranteed. That means, the negative impact 
of being unemployed on social life can not be compensated. 
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In order to prove the existence of a compensated unemployment equilibrium, 
let T e fl be a vector of sufficiently high taxes, i.e., nobody wants to buy anything 
of commodity j if Tj is the tax on net purchases of commodity j and there exists a 
commodity h with tax t^ equal to zero. The assumptions A2 and A3 of Section 2 
guarantee the existence of such a vector T as long as the subsidies s1 are bounded. It 
can be easily observed that because of the monotonicity of the Utilities the best 
element x1 in B^p.-w.t.O) has a lower utility than the best element y1 in 
B1(p,/,t,pTw1) for any / < 0 . Hence, the monotonicity of the Utilities guarantees that 
there exists an s1 < p w1 such that s1 just compensates for the supply rationing /. 
So, the compensations are bounded by pTwJ. For all q e Q (see (7.1)) we set p(q) 
and l(q) as defined in (7.2) and (7.3), and define t:(q) by 
tj(q) - max (0, (qj-Pj)/j5j)Tj, j = 0,...,n. 
Clearly t:(q) = 0 if q= < f>j and /:(q) = -w- if qj > rjj- Let x*(q) be the optimal 
consumption in the budget set B*(q) = B1(p(q),/(q),t(q),s1(q)) with s*(q) defined such 
that the utility of the optimal consumption x*(q) in the budget set B1(p(q),-w, 
t(q),0) is equal to u^x^q)). From the monotonicity of the preferences it follows that 
s\q) is unique (and bounded by pTwJ). From the strict quasi-concavity of the 
utility functions it follows that the excess demand function z: Q —» R n defined by 
i i * 
z(q) = Ej (x (q) - w ) is continuous. It can be proved that z has a zero point q in Q 
such that there exists a j with q • < p- and an h + j with q ^ > p^ ;. Clearly, 
such a zero point yields an equilibrium x (q ), s (q ), i=l,...,m, p(q ), /(q ), and t(q ), 
with p^(q ) = pjj, /jj(q ) = -w^, and t:(q ) = 0. This gives us the next theorem. 
Theorem 11.2. There exists a compensated unemployment theorem with t- = 0 for at 
least one j , and p^ = p^ for at least one h # j . 
Recall that in case of supply constrained equilibria there are two trivial zero 
points of z in Q, namely q = 0 and q = 2p (see Section 7). Also here the latter 
point yields a trivial equilibrium with t- = Tj for all j , since for all i, x1 = w1 is a 
maximal element in the budget set B^p.-w.T.O). At q = 0 however, we have t: = 0 
for all j , p = n and / = 0. Because all taxes are equal to zero it follows from b) of 
Definition 11.1 that s1 must be equal to zero for all i. However, / = 0 implies that s1 
> 0 unless x1 = w1 is maximal in the budget set {x e X1 j Ë T X < n w1}. Hence, q = 0 
does not yield a trivial equilibrium. Since the theorem says that there is an 
' The existence of such a «ero point can be proved by simplicial approximation theory and is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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equilibrium with t: = 0 for at least one j , this implies the existence of a nontrivial 
equilibrium. 
From the discussion above it follows that it is possible to compensate 
unemployed people for the loss of utility caused by the supply constraints and that 
the unemployment doles can be financed through taxes on the net purchases. Let us 
consider an example of an economy with two commodities and two types of agents. 
Agents of type A have initial endowments of commodity 1 and (almost) no 
endowments of commodity 2, while for agents of type B the opposite holds. So, at all 
prices, agents of type A supply commodity 1 and demand commodity 2 and reversely 
for agents of type B. Now take pj - 1, let p 2 be the unique Walrasian equilibrium 
* 
pnce for commodity 2, and suppose that P2 < p 2 *s a fixed price for commodity 2. 
Since the price of commodity 2 is too low compared to the equilibrium price, we 
have that at this price system there is an excess supply of commodity 1 and an excess 
demand of commodity 2. So, a compensated equilibrium will be reached through 
rationing on the supplies of commodity 1 and levying a tax on the purchases of 
commodity 2. Consequently, agents of type B are not constrained and do not pay 
taxes. On the other hand agents of type A pay a tax on the purchase of commodity 2, 
while at least some of them are rationed in the supplies. In case there is only one 
agent of type A, this agent pays his own unemployment compensation. This is 
illustrated in the Edgeworth box of Figure 11.1. The outcome seems to be rather 
unsatisfactory. However, observe that this agent is not totally unemployed, because 
he can offer for sale an amount equal to the demand of the agent of type B. In case 
of non-uniform rationing with each agent either unrationed or (totally) unemployed 
the employed agents of type A pay taxes to finance the unemployment compensation 
of the others. If there is uncertainty about which agents of type A are unemployed, 
we can say that the tax paid by an agent of type A is a social Insurance premium 
against the loss of income when loosing his job, i.e., for when being excluded from 
the possibility to sell commodity 2. 
Insert Figure 11.1. 
The vector of sales taxes plays two roles in the model of a compensated 
unemployment equilibrium. Firstly, the unemployment compensation is financed from 
the tax revenue, as has been discussed above. Secondly, through the system of 
differentiated taxes the tax vector serves as an instrument to equalize demand and 
supply. Supply rationing occurs on markets of commodities with relative high prices, 
whereas there is a purchase tax on the commodities with relative low prices. In fact, 
for the latter commodities the demand rationing has been replaced by taxing the net 
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purchases. Since we introduced the tax vector in order to finance the unemployment 
compensations the second role of the tax vector is figurative. Therefore, let us 
consider a model in which the unemployment compensations are financed through a 
tax on the income of the agents. In that case a percentage of the income is paid as an 
insurance premium against unemployment. Each agent f aces a tax rate a E [0,1] to 
be paid over his tax income. For some positive vector a E n, the tax income of agent 
i, i =l,...,m, is defined by 
l\x) = pT(w i-x-a)+ , x e X1, 
i.e., tax must be paid over the value of the total net sales of the commodities, except 
that for each commodity j there is some positive amount a: which can be sold free of 
tax. Given a price p e P, a rationing scheme / < 0, an income tax rate a, and a 
compensation s1, the budget set of consumer i becomes 
B W . O . S 1 ) = {x G X1 j pTx + oL\x) < pTwJ + s1, / < x -w1}. 
Definition 11.3. An income tax unemployment equilibrium is an allocation x1, i = 
1,....,m, a rationing scheme / e -Cl, an income tax rate a e [0,1], a price vector p e 
P, and a set of compensations s1, i = l,...,m, such that 
a) x1 maximizes u1 on B^p./.a.s1) 
b) E| (x1 - w1) = 0 and Ej S; = aEj i V ) -
c) for all j , p : > p_: implies /: < x1: - w1: for all i, 
d) for all i, u^x1) = u^x1) where x1 maximizes u1 on the budget set 
B^p.-w.a.O) and x1 on B^pJ -a^s 1 ) . 
Again, condition b) implies that total tax revenue equals total amount of 
compensations. The compensation of agent i is determined by d). The unemployment 
dole compensates the loss of utility due to the rationing /-a. So, if agent i wants to 
sell more than -/:, but not more than -/;+a:, then he is not compensated for the 
constraint on commodity j . This reflects the f act that for all j , a part p:a: of the 
value of the net sale is free of tax, i.e., unemployment is not insured as long as the 
unemployment is less or equal to some amount. The introduction of a (relatively 
small) tax free vector is not only reasonable, since small risks are typically not 
insured, but has also a technical reason. Suppose that a = 0. Then a = 1, in which 
case all income is taxed away, implies that x1 = w1 is a maximal element in the 
budget set for all / < 0 and s1 = 0. Hence, in this case a = 1 yields a trivial 
equilibrium for all / < 0. However, for a positive vector a only 1 = 0 implies that x1 = 
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w1 is a maximal element of the budget set and therefore yields a trivial equilibrium, 
because / # 0 may result in a positive supply of some commodity. 
We have seen that in the model with taxes on net purchases there are n+1 
instruments to equilibriate the n+2 equations of condition b). Now, however, there 
are n+2 instruments, namely a rationing instrument on each market and the tax rate 
a. However, by Walras' law we know that all equations hold as soon as n+1 are 
equalized. It follows that an additional condition can be stated. The next theorem 
says that there exists an equilibrium with at least one unrationed commodity. 
Theorem 11.4. There exists an income tax unemployment equilibrium with l- = -w-
for at least one j . 
For the proof, see van der Laan (1981). 
A 
We fmally consider the case that rj; = P; = P; for all j and make some 
remarks under several assumptions which we will not further discuss. First, let us 
A 
assume that there is a unique equilibrium with /: = -w- for some j . Let a = 
a(p) be the tax rate at this equilibrium. Then it can be proved (see van der Laan 
A 
(1981)) that for all a E [a,l] there is an income tax unemployment equilibrium, 
with /: = l-(a) > -W-. We have already seen that for a = 1, / = .0 yields a trivial 
J J J
 - A 
equilibrium. In fact, when raising a from a to 1 the rationing is tightened (not 
necessarily monotonically) from /• = -w- for at least one j to /: = 0 for all j . In other 
words, raising the tax rate decreases the employment possibilities. Further, assume 
that there is a unique Walrasian price system p = (p Q,...,P
 n ) . Then, if p = p is 
the vector of fixed prices, the unique Walrasian equilibrium allocation is induced by 
the income tax unemployment equilibrium with / = -w, a = 0, and s1 = 0 for all i. 
Moreover, for each a e (0,1], there exists an income tax unemployment equilibrium 
with / = /(a) > -w. From this we come to the conclusion that a positive income tax 
rate at the Walrasian price system p induces unemployment. When we assume that 
A A 
a(p) is continuous in p, then for any given Q > 0, there is an income tax 
A * 
unemployment equilibrium for all p close enough to p . So, a positive tax rate 
stabilizes the system in the sense that for small (temporarily) disturbances in the 
prices there still exists an equilibrium with the same income tax rate, i.e., the 
unemployment induced by a absorbs disturbances of the equilibrium prices, as long 
as these disturbances are not too large. 
12. Monev adiustment 
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In the previous section we have seen that in a compensated unemployment 
equilibrium it is not possible to guarantee that there is neither rationing nor taxing 
on an a priori chosen numeraire commodity. However, in a monetary economy 
rationing or taxing on money does not seem to be a very satisfactory result. 
Therefore we discuss a modification of the compensated unemployment equilibrium, 
such that there is neither rationing nor taxing on the numeraire commodity money. 
In Section 9 we have seen that rationing on money in a supply-constrained 
equilibrium can be excluded by flexible money prices. In fact, rationing of money 
can be excluded by choosing the price level high enough. In an economy with 
rationing and taxing, however, we can deal with non-flexible money prices by 
allowing for the fact that the total amount of tax revenue and the total amount of 
lump-sum unemployment compensations may differ. 
With the commodity indexed by j = 0 as the numeraire commodity the set of 
admissible prices becomes 
P = {p € n | p 0 = 1, E j < Pj < Pj for all j # 0}. 
with for all j # 0, 0 < p_: < p: < oo. 
Definition 12.1. A monetary compensated unemployment equilibrium is an ailocation 
x
1
, i = l,...,m, a rationing scheme / e -f), a tax vector t 6 fi, a price vector p € P, 
and a set of lump-sum compensations s1, i = l,...,m, such that 
1) the conditions a), c), d), and e) of Definition 11.1 hold, 
2) t0 = 0, and /Q = -wQ, 
3) Ej (xVj - w*j) = 0 for j = l,...,n, and E; xlQ - Ej w ^ = Ej s1 - E; t ^ x ' - w V . 
Condition 2) means that neither taxing nor rationing on money is allowed. This 
condition also excludes the trivial equilibrium with t: = T:, j = l,...,n, with T= large 
enough. The first part of condition 3) requires that all non-money markets are in 
equilibrium. The second part follows then immediately from the fact that utility 
maximization implies that the total value of the total excess demands must be equal 
to the total amount of compensations minus the total tax revenue. It says that the 
total difference between the terminal and initial holdings of money equals the 
difference between the total amount of lump-sum subsidies and the total tax revenue. 
Theorem 12.2. There exists a monetary compensated unemployment equilibrium. 
For the proof we refer to van der Laan (1980, Theorem 4). 
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Clearly, a monetary compensated unemployment equilibrium does not imply 
that the total tax revenue Ej tT(x1-w1)+ equals the total lump-sum compensations Ej 
s1. In Section 11 the only role of the government was to collect the taxes and to 
distribute the revenue. However, in a monetary economy the government must also 
increase or decrease the total amount of money in order to obtain equilibrium. This 
results in respectively inflationary or deflationary impulses. 
In the two sector model of Malinvaud the government demand for the 
consumption good serves as an instrument for economie policy. By choosing an 
exogenous demand the government has the possibility to increase or to decrease the 
demand for the consumption good. The demand of the government results in an 
increase or decrease of the total amount of money equal to the value of the demand 
minus the income of the government. In the Malinvaud model this income comes 
from taxing away the profits of the producers. So, the real savings of the consumers 
are equal to the money creation or destruction by the government, being the 
difference between the spending of the government on the consumption good and the 
income of the government. Dehez and Gabszewicz (1977, 1979) presented a 
Malinvaud-type model in which the government appears as an active economie agent 
reducing excess demand or absorbing excess supply on the commodity market. In a 
dynamic setting, this behaviour forces the economy towards a stationary state, i.e., an 
equilibrium such that the total initial amount of money equals the total terminal 
holdings of money and hence real savings are equal to zero. More precisely, assume 
that in each period the initial holding of money of any consumer is equal to his 
terminal holding of money at the end of the previous period, with the initial holdings 
at the first period given, then Dehez and Gabszewicz showed that under some 
assumptions the sequence of disequilibrium states for the subsequent periods 
converges to a stationary equilibrium state. 
In the model of a monetary unemployment equilibrium we have that the 
money creation or destruction is endogeneously determined by the difference 
between the unemployment compensations and the tax revenue. Let us consider the 
consequences of this policy for the Malinvaud-type example of an exchange economy 
as given in Section 5 (see Figure 5.1). Let p be a vector of fixed prices in region I, 
i.e., the region with excess supply on both markets. In our model this yields an 
equilibrium with supply rationing on both markets and hence unemployment 
compensations without tax revenue. So, the amount of money increases and the 
terminal holdings of money will be higher than the initial holdings. Hence, in the 
next period the initial holding of money will be higher. Assuming that for all non-
money commodities the initial endowments are constant over the periods, the 
Walrasian prices will move upwards because of the homogeneity of the equilibrium 
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prices and the money endowments. This is illustrated in Figure 12.1, where the 
Walrasian prices are assumed to move upwards from (p j , p 2) a^onë t n e curve 
WW'. If the fixed price vector p is on this curve, the sequence of Walrasian 
equilibrium prices will converge to p. On the other hand, the Walrasian prices will 
move downwards along WW' if p is initially in region III, i.e., the region with excess 
demand on both markets. Consequently, the model results into an equilibrium with 
taxes on the demands of both commodities and hence we have positive tax revenues 
without unemployment compensations. Again, the sequence of Walrasian equilibrium 
prices will converge to the vector p of fixed prices if p is on the curve WW'. As soon 
as the Walrasian prices become equal to p a stationary state has been reached. So, we 
have that the model is similar to the model of Dehez and Gabszewicz, except that the 
instrument of varying the demand of the consumption goods by the government has 
been replaced by the endogeneously determined system of taxes and unemployment 
compensations. 
Insert Figure 12.1. 
In case the vector of fixed prices does not lie on the curve WW', then the 
* 
Walrasian prices move along the curve WW' until a price vector p has been reached 
such that the real savings induced by the price system p are equal to zero. This is 
illustrated in Figure 12.2, in which the broken lines divide the price spaces into 
* 
regions I, II, III, and IV according to the final Walrasian price system p . Observe 
* 
that according to p the system of fixed prices lies in region II, while p lies in region 
I according to the initial Walrasian price system p . So, the regime of excess supplies 
on both markets switches to a mixed regime of excess demand on one market and 
excess supply on the other market when as a consequence of the real savings the 
w * Walrasian prices move from p " to p . 
Insert Figure 12.2. 
40 PRICE RIGIDITIES AND RATIONING 
REFERENCES 
Barro, R.J., and H.I. Grossman (1971) "A general disequilibrium model of 
income and unemployment", American Economie Review, 42, 82-93. 
Benassy, J-P. (1975) "Neo-Keynesian disequilibrium in a monetary economy", 
Review of Economie Studies, 42, 503-523. 
Benassy, J-P. (1982) The Economics of Market Disequilibrium, Academie 
Press, New-York. 
Clower, R.W. (1965) "The Keynesian counter-revolution: a theoretical 
appraisal", in F. Hahn and F. Brechling (eds.) The Theory of Interest Rates, 
Macmillan, London. 
Debreu, G. (1959) Theory of Value, Yale University Press, New Haven. 
Dehez, P., and J. Drèze (1984) "On supply-constrained equilibria", Journal of 
Economie Theory, 33, 1172-1182. 
Dehez, P., and J.J. Gabszewicz (1977) "Saving behavior and disequilibrium 
analysis", Colloques Internationaux au C.N.R.S., 259, 197-212. 
Dehez, P., and J.J. Gabszewicz (1979) "On disequilibrium savings and public 
consumption", Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 39, 53-61. 
Drazen, A. (1980) "Recent developments in macroeconomic disequilibrium 
theory", Econometrica, 48, 283-306. 
Drèze, J. (1975) "Existence of an exchange equilibrium under price rigidities", 
International Economie Review, 16, 310-320. 
Grandmont, J.M. (1977) "Temporary general equilibrium theory", 
Econometrica, 43, 535-572. 
Grandmont, J.M., and G. Laroque (1976) "On Keynesian temporary 
equilibria", Review of Economie Studies, 43, 53-67. 
Hahn, F.H. (1978) "On non-Walrasian equilibria", Review of Economie Studies, 
45, 1-17. 
Kurz, M. (1982) "Unemployment equilibrium in an economy with linked 
prices", Journal of Economie Theory, 26, 110-123. 
Laan, G. van der (1980) "Equilibrium under rigid prices with compensation 
for the consumers", International Economie Review, 21, 53-73. 
Laan, G. van der (1981) "Unemployment equilibria: some results on existence 
and optimality of fixed price equilibria with supply rationing", Research 
Memorandum, Free University, Amsterdam. 
Laan, G. van der (1982) "Simplicial approximation of unemployment 
equilibria", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 9, 83-97. 
Laan, G. van der (1984) "Supply-constrained fixed price equilibria in 
monetary economies", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 13, 171-187. 
41 PRICE RIGIDITIES AND RATIONING 
Laan, G. van der, and A.J.J. Talman, (1987) "Computing economie equilibria 
by variable dimension algorithms: state of the art", Research Memorandum 1987-40, 
Free University, Amsterdam. 
Laroque, G. (1978) "The fixed price equilibria: some results in local 
comparitive staties", Econometrica, 46, 1127-1154. 
Leijonhufvud, A. (1968) On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of 
Keynes, Oxford University Press, London. 
Malinvaud, E (1977) The Theory of Unemployment Reconsidered, Basil 
Blackwell Ltd, Oxford. 
Svensson, L.E.O. (1980) "Effective demand and stochastic rationing", Review 
of Economie Studies, 47, 339-356. 
Weddepohl, H.N. (forthcoming) "Supply-constrained equilibria in economies 
with indexed prices", Journal of Economie Theory. 
Wu, H. (1985) "Unemployment equilibrium in a random economy", Research 
paper, Stanford University, Stanford. 
Younès, Y. (1975) "On the role of money in the process of exchange and the 
existence of a non-Walrasian equilibrium", Review of Economie Studies, 42, 489-501. 
42 
•B 
Figure 4.1. 
43 
Figure 5.1. 
44 
W 
W 
CÜL 
KÜb 
R l 
r 
Figure 5.2. 
45 
Figure 7.1. 
46 
Figure 7.2. 
47 
r
oC 
->?! 
Figure 10.1. 
48 
crfi * 
* * . 
Figure 11.1. 
49 
Figure 12.1 
50 
Figure 12.2. 
